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Articles
Evidence of Habit and Routine Practice
William A. Schroeder*
I. INTRODUCTION
Evidence of habit and routine practice is often relevant to prove that
on a particular occasion a person or organization' acted in a manner
consistent with that habit or practice.2 Illinois courts have taken a
variety of approaches to the admissibility of such evidence. Some
cases, many of them recent, suggest that evidence of habit and routine
practice is admissible on the same terms as other relevant evidence.3 A
few cases suggest that the admissibility of habit evidence lies within
the trial court's discretion.4 Still other cases hold that "evidence of
* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law; Harvard Law
School, LL.M., 1977; University of Illinois College of Law, J.D., 1969. Author,
MISSOURI EVIDENCE (West 1992); Co-author, ALABAMA EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1993); Deterring
Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J.
1361 (1983); The Future of Frye in Illinois, 82 ILL. B.J. 488 (1994).
This article is based on materials prepared by the author for the Illinois Judicial
Conference 1996-97 Seminar Series, Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases.
1. This article will address only the habits and routine practices of persons and
organizations. It does not address questions such as the habits of animals. See
generally, Domm v. Hollenbeck, 102 N.E. 782, 783-84 (I11. 1913) (discussing a dog's
propensity for violence); People v. Jones, 89 N.E. 752, 754-55 (I11. 1909) (discussing a
bull's propensity for violence).
2. Evidence of an individual's habits has sometimes been admitted for purposes other
than to show conduct consistent with the habit. See Grand Lodge Ancient Order of
United Workmen v. Belcham, 33 N.E. 886, 887 (I11. 1893) (holding that to prove the
insured lied on an application when he denied he used "alcoholic stimulants," the insurer
had to show not just the insured's occasional use of such substances, but rather "a habit
or custom" on the part of the insured); Gallagher v. People, 11 N.E. 335, 336 (It1. 1887)
(holding that where defendant was charged with "selling intoxicating liquor to persons
in the habit of getting intoxicated" no error occurred when the trial court permitted a
witness to answer that persons alleged to be "in the habit of getting intoxicated were in
such habit"); People v. Thomas, 421 N.E.2d 357, 366 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1981) (stating
that, when sentencing an offender, a court "may inquire into the general moral character
of the offender, his mentality, his habits, his social environments, his abnormal or
subnormal tendencies, his age, . .. and the stimuli which motivated his conduct").
3. See infra notes 88, 97-98 (citing cases addressing habit); infra note 102 (citing
cases addressing routine practice).
4. See, e.g., Solomon v. The Fair, 183 N.E.2d 588, 589, 590-91 (I11. App. 1st Dist.
385
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habit or general practice is not admissible as proof of behavior and
conformity with that habit on a specific occasion." 5 Most often,
however, Illinois courts limit the admissibility of such evidence
through a variety of arcane and archaic rules.
Traditionally, evidence of routine practice has been admissible to
show that the practice was followed on a particular occasion only if
corroborating evidence demonstrates that the practice was, in fact,
followed on that occasion.6 Evidence of a person's careful habits has
traditionally been admitted in wrongful death and personal injury
actions, where a showing of due care at the time of the occurrence was
necessary to recovery, only if no competent eyewitnesses could testify
to the victim's behavior at the time of the occurrence.7
1962) (holding that the trial court did not err in permitting a defendant delivery man to
testify to his "custom and habit with respect to due care and caution" in making similar
deliveries and to testify that "he placed bed frames wherever people directed him to place
them" when he had no independent recollection of delivering a bed frame on which
plaintiff was injured and could not say whether he or his helper delivered the bed frame in
question). The admission of such evidence, said the court, "depends on the facts of each
case." Id. at 590.
5. People v. West, 429 N.E.2d 599, 603 (I11. App. 2d Dist. 1981) (holding that it was
harmless error for trial court to admit witness' testimony about her usual practices when
witness admitted that she had no detailed knowledge of the occasion in question) (citing
City of Salem v. Webster, 61 N.E. 323 (II1. 1901); Goetz v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 328
N.E.2d 109 (II1. App. 1st Dist. 1985)); cf. Herget Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 316 N.E.2d
191, 193 (III. App. 3d Dist. 1974) (stating that evidence of a person's conduct on one
occasion is irrelevant to show "his conduct on the occasion in issue, except to show
habit, state of mind, knowledge or intent and the like").
6. See Goetz, 328 N.E.2d at 115 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1975) (holding that evidence of
routine practices is admissible only if other evidence also tends to show that the practice
was followed on the occasion in question); see also State Bank v. Standaert, 82 N.E.2d
393, 396-97 (I11. App. 2d Dist. 1948) (holding that where there was no evidence of
either a dictation or writing of the particular notice of dishonor nor records of any kind
indicating that the notice was mailed, plaintiff's evidence was insufficient).
7. See Plank v. Holman, 264 N.E.2d 12, 14-15 (III. 1970) (holding that secondary
evidence of careful habits should not have been permitted where plaintiff could have
testified to her deceased husband's due care at the time of the accident); Cairns v. Hansen,
524 N,.2d 939, 945-46 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1988) (holding that plaintiff's proffered
evidence of due care was properly ruled inadmissible where there were eyewitnesses, and
stating that "the established rule" in Illinois is that "in wrongful death cases, where
there are no competent eyewitnesses, and the plaintiff has the burden of proving the
person injured exercised the proper degree of care ... evidence of prior careful habits...
may be admitted as tending to prove the deceased's exercise of due care"); Gardner v.
Geraghty, 423 N.E.2d 1321, 1324-25 (II1. App. 1st Dist. 1981) (noting that habit
evidence is generally barred, but evidence of careful habits is permitted in wrongful death
cases "where there are no eyewitnesses to the accident").
In Herget National Bank v. Johnson, 316 N.E.2d 191, 193 (II1. App. 3d Dist. 1974),
the court stated:
[I]t has long been the recognized rule of personal injury and wrongful death
actions arising out of motor vehicle accidents that evidence of habits and
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Looking at these approaches, the appellate court recently observed
that Illinois law governing the admissibility of evidence of habit and
routine practice is "inconsistent" and "uncertain." 8 This article will
examine the history and evolution of the law governing the
admissibility of habit and routine practice evidence.9 The article
concludes that Illinois should, as proposed in some recent appellate
court decisions, adopt Rule 406 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.'
II. EVIDENCE OF HABIT AND ROUTINE PRACrICE: A BRIEF
HISTORY
A. Definitions and General Rule
Much of the complexity in the law governing evidence of "habit,"
"custom," and "routine practice" stems from the failure of Illinois
courts to adequately define these terms and to distinguish evidence of
"habit" from evidence of "character." Some of these terms have never
been defined by Illinois courts. Others have been defined or used in
more than one way. The lack of agreed upon definitions has made
meaningful discussion and analysis of the law in this area almost
impossible."
This article will use the definitions of "habit" and "routine practice"
contained in recent Illinois cases, as well as the generally accepted
customary behavior of one killed or injured by the alleged negligence of
another is admissible on the issue of the former's conduct at and immediately
prior to the time of accident. Illinois still adheres to the principle that the rule
is one of necessity, available only where there are no competent
eyewitnesses.
Herget, 316 N.E.2d at 194.
8. People v. Keller, 641 N.E.2d 891, 895 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1994) (surveying cases
that suggest Illinois courts are uncertain about the effect of a witness' presence on the
admissibility of careful habits evidence, and are inconsistent in admitting habit or
custom evidence when offered for a purpose other than showing careful habits). The
Keller court noted that "the rule has been discussed with seemingly inconsistent results
in cases in which the party offering habit or custom evidence sought to establish other
than careful habits" and "the rule governing admissibility of habit or custom evidence
has an uncertain history." Id.
9. See infra Part II (discussing the evolution of the use of habit and routine practice
evidence in Illinois).
10. See infra Parts IV and V (suggesting that the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence
406 would clarify the use of habit and routine practice evidence).
11. See 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5272, at 18 (1980) (suggesting that the lack of definitions was a
deliberate strategy used by some courts so that they could admit or reject evidence on the
basis of labels without revealing their real reasons for doing so).
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definition of "character."' 2 Those definitions are reasonably
unambiguous and consistent with the definitions used in most
jurisdictions and by most authorities. Because Illinois courts have
failed to clearly define "custom," this article will not use this term.
"Habit" has been said by the Illinois Appellate Court to be a
person's "regular practice of responding to a particular kind of
repeated situation with a specific type of conduct."' 13  Unvarying
regularity is the key. A mere tendency to act in a particular manner is
not a habit, 4 although it may be a manifestation of a character trait.
"Routine practice" refers to behavior of a group or organization that
would be termed habit if engaged in by an individual." "Custom" has
sometimes been used by Illinois courts as a synonym for habit. 16 It
has also been used as a synonym for routine business practices.' 7
Because its meaning is unclear, the term "custom" is best not used to
describe evidence whose relevance lies in its tendency to prove that
12. See infra note 13 and accompanying text (defining "habit"); infra text
accompanying note 15 (defining "routine practice"); and infra notes 19-20 and
accompanying text (defining "character").
13. People v. Miller, 519 N.E.2d 717, 720 (I11. App. 3d Dist. 1988) (citing MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 307(l) (1942)); see also Hajian v. Holy Family Hosp., 652
N.E.2d 1132, 1140 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1995) (defining a habit as conduct that is
"semiautomatic, invariably regular, and not merely a tendency to act in a given
manner"); Knecht v. Radiac Abrasives, Inc., 579 N.E.2d 1248, 1252-53 (I11. App. 5th
Dist. 1991) (requiring that habit evidence establish conduct that is "semiautomatic,
invariably regular, and not merely a tendency to act in a given manner"); cf. FED. R.
EvID. 406, advisory committee's note (noting that "'[hlabit' ... describes one's regular
response to a repeated specific situation").
See generally MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, CLEARY & GRAHAM'S HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS
EVIDENCE § 406.1 (6th ed. 1994) (citing Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Bell, 70
I11. 102 (1873)), defines habit as "a settled way of doing a particular thing." Id.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad v. Bell, cited by Graham, does not, in fact,
define "habit." Bell was an appeal from a judgment for a plaintiff who had sought
damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate and the loss of his horses and wagon when
struck by defendant's train. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Bell, 70 III. 102,
104 (1873). The court held that evidence of the deceased's personal habits when
intoxicated was properly rejected in the absence of "some particularizing of the habits
offered to be proved, so that it might be seen that the proof of them might have some
legitimate bearing upon the issue." Id. at 105.
14. See Hajian, 652 N.E.2d at 1140; Knecht, 579 N.E. at 1253.
15. See FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee's note.
16. See American Express Co. v. Haggard, 37 I11. 465, 473 (1865).
17. For a description of routine business practices, see I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
195, at 828 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (practitioner treatise series)
(referring to "evidence of the 'custom' of a business organization"). See also id. at 826
n.5 (quoting MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 307(1) (1942)) (stating that "[c]ustom
means a course of behavior of a group of persons regularly repeated in like
circumstances").
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"behavior on a specified occasion conformed to the custom."' 18
"Character" refers to "the nature of a person, his disposition
generally, or his disposition in respect to a general trait such as
honesty, peacefulness or truthfulness."' 9 Thus, character is less
specific than habit. One authority has observed that "[i]f we think of
character for care, we think of the person's tendency to act prudently
in all the varying situations of life." 20
Illinois courts have consistently stated that evidence of character, or
traits of character, is inadmissible in civil cases to prove conduct
consistent with the character trait shown.2' In criminal cases in
18. Id. at 828 n. 14 (quoting MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 307(2) (1942)).
Evidence of custom is sometimes received to show the usual way in which an act is
done in order to raise the inference that an act performed in that way was not negligent.
See Fowler v. Chicago Railways Co., 120 N.E. 635, 637 (III. 1918) (citing Campbell v.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 90 N.E. 1106 (I11. 1910)). Conversely, evidence
that an act was not done in the usual way is admissible to show that it was done
negligently. Turner v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 136 N.E.2d 543, 545 (Iii. App. 1st Dist.
1956).
The Uniform Commercial Code provides for the use of evidence of custom and usage to
explain ambiguous terms in contracts. See 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/2-202(a), 5/2-
208(2), 5/2-314(3) (West 1994) (recognizing that implied warranties may arise from
"course of dealing or usage of trade"). Illinois defines a course of dealing as "a sequence
of previous conduct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be
regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their
expressions and other conduct" and defines usage of trade as "any practice or method of
dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an
expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." Id. at
5/1-205 (West 1994); cf Colderwood v. McCrea, 11 111. App. 543, 546 (1st Dist. 1882)
(noting that in order to ascertain the intent of parties to contract, it was proper "to show
how they were in the habit of dealing together in respect to like transactions").
19. GRAHAM, supra note 13, § 404.1, at 195; see also I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 17, § 195, at 825 (describing character as "a generalized description of a
person's disposition, or of the disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty,
temperance, or peacefulness").
20. I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, § 195, at 825 (quoted with approval in
FED. R. EvID. 406 advisory committee's note).
21. See, e.g., Joseph Taylor Coal Co. v. Dawes, 77 N.E. 131, 132 (II1. 1906) (stating
rule, but finding an exception to the ban on character evidence when such evidence was
used to establish the mental state of an allegedly negligent mine shaft operator);
Holzman v. Hoy, 8 N.E. 832, 832-33 (I11. 1886) (finding that the trial court did not err
in a medical malpractice case when it barred a defense witness from testifying to
defendant doctor's professional reputation in the community and stating that
"defendant's skill or rather the want of it, . . . [could not] be either established or
disproved by showing his general reputation."); Crose v. Rutledge, 81 III. 266, 267
(1876) (stating that the law prohibited the receiving of character evidence with respect
to the parties to an action to raise "a presumption disadvantageous or unfavorable to
either of them" and adding that "[|in a prosecution for an infamous offense evidence of
an admission by the accused that he was addicted to the commission of similar offenses
is... irrelevant."); see also Hickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 201 N.E.2d 742, 746
(Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1964) (stating that in ordinary civil cases, parties may not support
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Illinois, character is inadmissible if offered by the state as part of its
case-in-chief.2 2  However, it may be admissible to prove conduct
under other limited circumstances.'
B. The Early Cases: Haggard, Stolp, and Thorp
In 1987, in Bradfield v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co.,24 the
Illinois Supreme Court stated that "evidence of habit and custom...
was held properly admitted in American Express Co. v. Haggard,25
[decided in 1865] and ... has been admitted since that time without
proof of necessity. 26 Six years later, in People v. Keller,27 the
Illinois Appellate Court echoed these observations and cited Stolp v.
their position by evidence of their good character); McBean v. Fox, 1 111. App. 177, 187
(1st Dist. 1878) (holding that the trial court erred in permitting defendant, charged with
fraud in a business transaction, to defend by showing his good character and reputation).
The McBean court noted, however, that evidence of good character may be shown in
some criminal settings and in civil cases where character is in issue as in slander actions
and actions for "seduction, criminal conversation, and breach of promises of marriage."
Id. at 186; cf. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (barring the use of character evidence to prove
conduct except for limited uses in criminal cases).
22. See People v. Randle, 498 N.E.2d 732, 736 (II1. App. 2d Dist. 1986) (stating that
"[tihe state may not initially introduce evidence of bad character against a defendant
because it is feared that the jury will be swayed to convict [the defendant] ... because the
defendant is a bad person"); see also People v. Rogers, 154 N.E. 909, 912 (II1. 1926)
(stating that "[it is not, however, competent ... to prove a habit or predisposition of
the accused, or to introduce evidence of another crime on the ground that proof of such
crime shows the probability that he committed the crime charged in the indictment"); cf.
FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (providing that in certain circumstances, evidence of the character
of the accused and the character of crime victims may be admissible).
23. See, e.g., People v. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d 1018, 1020-21 (Ill. 1984) (holding that
in cases where self-defense is claimed, evidence of the aggressive character of the victim
is admissible to show that the victim acted in a manner consistent with his character and
to show that defendant knew of that character and, therefore, felt threatened even in an
otherwise ambiguous setting); People v. Flax, 498 N.E.2d 667, 672 (III. App. Ist Dist.
1986) (stating that a defendant in a criminal case may introduce evidence of his general
reputation to establish that his character traits are inconsistent with the specific crime
charged); Randle, 498 N.E.2d at 736 (I11. App. 2d Dist. 1986) (holding that prosecution
may not introduce evidence of defendant's bad character to prove his guilt unless the
defendant first introduces evidence of his good character); cf. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1)
(allowing the prosecution to rebut character evidence offered by the accused).
24. 505 N.E.2d 331 (I11. 1987).
25. 37 Iil. 465 (1865).
26. Bradfield, 505 N.E.2d at 333. The court stated that "[iut has long been established
that habit testimony is relevant and the only limitations imposed on its admission have
been on the basis of necessity." Id. at 333-34. The court found that it is thus
"questionable whether the cases [relying on the eyewitness rule] ... are on point." Id. at
334.
27. 641 N.E.2d 891 (111. App. 1st Dist. 1994).
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Blair" and Thorp v. Goewey,2 9 two nineteenth-century cases that
permitted the introduction of habit or custom evidence under specific
circumstances. In Keller, the appellate court concluded that "the better
rule, which has been accepted by the supreme court, although a long
time ago, is that habit and custom evidence may be admitted provided
that a proper foundation has been established. 30
On close examination, Haggard, Stolp, and Thorp present a more
complex picture than what appears at first glance. In Haggard, the
plaintiff sought to recover $170.30 from the defendant for failing to
deliver a package of money sent to the plaintiff by his agent. 3' On
direct examination, a defense witness testified that it was the custom of
the defendant's wagon drivers never to deliver parcels without
obtaining a written receipt.32 The supreme court held that given the
direct examination, the trial court did not err in allowing the plaintiff to
show, on cross-examination, that "it was the custom of the particular
driver who had this package to steal money parcels." 33
Although the Haggard court never used the word "habit," the
evidence received on direct examination could fairly be characterized as
evidence of a habit, that is, evidence of a semiautomatic, regular
practice of requiring a written receipt. The question before the
supreme court, however, was the admissibility of the evidence
received on cross-examination, regarding the custom of the driver to
steal money parcels. 34 This evidence can only be characterized as habit
evidence if it was this particular driver's unvarying, semiautomatic
response to steal parcels containing money, every time he had custody
of such parcels. Such behavior is unlikely; it is more likely that he
stole only when presented with the opportunity to do so without
getting caught. Therefore, the evidence at issue in Haggard is more
fairly characterized as evidence of the driver's disposition or character,
not his habit.
Eight years later, in Stolp, a suit to recover money loaned to the
defendant, the supreme court held that the trial court properly allowed
plaintiff to introduce evidence that he had frequently lent money to
others without taking written notes from the debtors as proof of the
28. 68 II1. 541 (1873).
29. 85 IlI. 611 (1877).
30. Keller, 641 N.E.2d at 896. The Keller court made "no pronouncement one way or
the other as to the requirement that there be no eyewitness available before habit or
custom evidence is admissible." Id.
31. See American Express Co. v. Haggard, 37 III. 465, 470-71 (1865).
32. See id. at 469.
33. Id. at 473.
34. See id. at 472-73.
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debt.35 Like the Haggard court, the Stolp court did not use the word
"habit" to characterize the evidence. It appears, however, that the
plaintiff regularly lent money and invariably failed to acquire written
evidence of the debt.36 One could fairly characterize this action, or
inaction, as a semiautomatic, regular response, and, therefore, a
habit.3
7
In 1877, in Thorp, the supreme court held that the trial court
properly admitted evidence showing the deceased "was prompt to pay
his debts, prudent, careful, credit good ... and did not like to be in
debt," and suggested that because he had "these habits of life," it was
unreasonable to believe that the deceased would leave a note
outstanding for seventeen years.38 Thorp is the first Illinois case to
use the word "habit." However, the "habits" attributed to the
deceased, even if they could be described as "habits" in a lay sense, do
not appear to be the kind of semiautomatic responses to particular
stimuli that would constitute habit in a legal sense. Rather, the
evidence in question demonstrated a trait of the deceased's character,
his careful behavior with money.
C. Careful Habits Evidence and the Eyewitness Rule
In 1883, the Illinois Supreme Court announced the first in a line of
cases that would further cloud an already murky picture by permitting,
under some circumstances, evidence purporting to demonstrate the
careful habits of a party whose behavior was in dispute.39 That year,
in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway v. Clark,4° the supreme
court held that the trial court did not err when it admitted evidence that
35. See Stolp v. Blair, 68 III. 541, 542 (1873). In another 1873 case, Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Railroad v. Bell, 70 III. 102, 105 (1873), the court held that a general
inquiry into the personal habits of the deceased was properly rejected absent "some
particularizing of the habits offered to be proved, so that it might be seen that they were
such as that the proof of them would have a legitimate bearing upon the issue." Id. at
105.
36. See Stolp, 68 I11. at 542.
37. One could argue that a failure to act does not reflect the pattern of stimulus and
automatic response that is the essence of habit. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note
11, § 5273, at 39; cf. Alvarado v. Goepp, 663 N.E.2d 63, 64-65 (I11. App. 1st Dist.
1996) (stating that evidence of defendant dentist's frequent failure to have a treatment
plan for patients could be admissible, in theory, but proffered testimony was too "vague,
general, and ambiguous" to constitute a proper foundation, especially given that
"plaintiff was attempting to establish a negative, a failure to do something").
38. Thorp v. Goewey, 85 III. 611, 614 (1877).
39. See Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Clark, 108 III. 113 (1883) (involving
the death of a railroad employee where evidence of employee's habits was important to
show he was not negligent at the time of an accident which had no surviving witnesses).
40. 108 III. 113 (1883).
392 [Vol. 29
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plaintiff's decedent was "habitually prudent, cautious and temperate"
to show that the decedent was exercising due care when defendant's
train struck and killed him." The court rejected defendant's argument
that habit evidence was always inadmissible, 42 holding that the
evidence was admissible, but stating that "[h]ad there been witnesses
who saw the infliction of the injury . . this evidence would not be
admissible." 43 The court cited no authorities in support of its ruling.
Instead, it focused on the fact that the plaintiff needed the evidence to
prove his decedent's freedom from contributory negligence, which
plaintiff was required to do, in order to recover any damages.44
Ten years later, in Toledo, St. Louis & Kansas City Railroad v.
Bailey,45 the supreme court held that evidence of the careful habits of
plaintiff's decedent, a train engineer, was admissible "as tending to
raise the presumption that he ... exercised due care and caution"
when he died.46 The court stated that the admissibility of this kind of
evidence was settled in Clark.47 However, the Bailey court did not
specifically state that the absence of eyewitnesses was a prerequisite to
admission of the evidence. Rather, it simply noted that no living
witnesses were available to testify to the manner in which the train
engineer operated the locomotive.'
41. Id. at 117.
42. See id.
43. Id. The court also expressed the view that, absent any eyewitness, "defendant
would surely have the right to prove the person was habitually rash, imprudent and
intemperate, to repel the presumption that he was in the exercise of proper care at the
time he received the injury." Id.
44. See id. at 117; see also Chicago North Shore Ry. v. Green, 93 Ill. App. 105, 109
(1st Dist. 1901) (noting that a plaintiff must "establish ... that the deceased, when
injured through [the] negligence of [defendant] ...was himself in the exercise of due
care and diligence").
45. 33 N.E. 1089 (I11. 1893) (concerning a wrongful death claim against the railroad
of the engineer of a train killed in an explosion of the engine).
46. Id. at 1089.
47. See id. In Sorenson v. Sorenson, 59 N.E. 555 (II1. 1901), the court overturned an
election where the voting rolls swelled from 50 to 59 just prior to the election. The
Sorenson court stated, "[c]ircumstantial evidence, such as party affiliation, relations
with candidates, etc., is always admitted to show how a person voted, and is generally
sufficient to prove the character of the vote." Id. at 556.
48. See Bailey, 33 N.E. at 1089; see also Plank v. Holman, 264 N.E.2d 12, 14-15
(Ii. 1970) (noting in a wrongful death action that it must be alleged and proved that "the
decedent was in the exercise of due care and caution ... at the time of the occurrence ..
[and] the use of secondary evidence of careful habits was allowable only if direct
evidence . . . [was] unavailable"). Thus, careful habits testimony was improperly
admitted because plaintiff, decedent's wife, was an eyewitness and "should have testified
as to her husband's due care at the time of the accident." Id.
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Later cases, perhaps influenced by decisions in other jurisdictions,49
made it clear that necessity was a limitation on the admissibility of
careful habits evidence. In Casey v. Chicago Railways Co.,-5 a 1915
wrongful death case, the supreme court stated that proof of plaintiff's
due care. must be shown by the best proof available. 5' The court
indicated that if there are no eyewitnesses, circumstances other than
habit must, if possible, be shown, "to raise the presumption of due
care." 52 If no such proof is available, however, the trial court may
receive evidence that the deceased was habitually careful, prudent, and
cautious.53 By 1921, it was clear that the established rule in Illinois
was that in wrongful death cases, if there was an eyewitness to the
accident that gave rise to the litigation, it was error to allow evidence
that the deceased was a man of careful habits.5
For many years, the admission of careful habits evidence, subject to
the eyewitness rule, was said to be limited to wrongful death actions. 55
Eventually, however, Illinois courts extended the rule to personal
injury actions. In 1967, the supreme court held that evidence of
careful habits was admissible to prove a plaintiff's due care in a
personal injury action where the plaintiff was the only eyewitness, and
was barred from testifying.' In justifying its ruling, the court stated
that "[c]onsiderations of hardship, which underlie our holdings that
admit careful habit evidence for a plaintiff in wrongful death cases
without eyewitnesses, present themselves just as forcefully under the
instant circumstances." 57 Other decisions expanded the rule to allow
evidence of a defendant's careful habits in both wrongful death s and
49. See I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supranote 17, § 189, at 795; id. § 195, at 828.
50. 109 N.E. 984 (I11. 1915).
51. See id. at 985.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See Petro v. Hines, 132 N.E. 462, 463-64 (I11. 1921) (holding that evidence of
the decedent's careful habits was inadmissible because an eyewitness to the death was
available).
55. See McElroy v. Force, 220 N.E.2d 761, 765-66 (Ill. App. 5th Dist. 1966) (noting
that several authors have said "that careful driving habit evidence is only admissible on
behalf of plaintiffs and then only in wrongful death cases" but disagreeing "that the
cases have so limited the rule"), aff'd, 232 N.E.2d 708 (III. 1967); cf. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pac. Ry. v. Clark, 108 II1. 113, 117 (1883) (stating in dicta, in a wrongful
death case, that absent any eyewitness, "defendant would surely have the right to prove
the person was habitually rash, imprudent and intemperate, to repel the presumption that
he was in the exercise of proper care at the time he received the injury").
56. See McElroy v. Force, 232 N.E.2d 708, 711 (Ii. 1967).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Logue v. Williams, 250 N.E.2d 159, 164 (III. App. 5th Dist. 1969)
(holding that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the careful habits of
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personal injury cases.59
1. The Nature of Careful Habits Evidence
The phrase "careful habits" can refer to two distinct concepts.6"
First, careful habits can refer to specific, regular, semiautomatic
responses to specific stimuli.6 For example, an individual who
always signals before turning, or always comes to a complete stop at
stop signs and never drives through them can be said to do these
things habitually.62 Such evidence is true evidence of habit. Second,
careful habits can refer to general traits or probabilities,63 such as
habits for care, promptness, or forgetfulness,"4 or somewhat less
general behaviors such as usually obeying traffic laws. 65  One
evidence scholar notes that "le]vidence of these [general traits ...
would be identical to the kind of evidence that is the target of the
general rule against character evidence., 66 It is this latter kind of
evidence, which is essentially evidence of a character trait, that Illinois
courts generally receive under the label, "careful habits evidence."'67
Illinois courts have not clearly acknowledged the difference between
these two kinds of habit evidence. Perhaps this is because the use of
the all encompassing word "habit" obscures the need to analyze the
underlying evidence. Or, perhaps it is because, as some authors have
defendant driver in a wrongful death action resulting from the death of a pedestrian).
59. See, e.g., Solomon v. The Fair, 183 N.E.2d 588, 589 (II1. App. 1st Dist. 1962)
(holding that where defendant delivery man had no independent recollection of
delivering bed frame on which plaintiff was injured and could not remember whether he
or his helper delivered the bed frame, the trial court did not err in permitting him to
testify as to his "custom and habit with respect to due care and caution in making other
similar deliveries" or in permitting him to testify that he placed bed frames wherever
directed by customers); see also McElroy, 220 N.E.2d at 765-66 (rejecting contention
that careful habits evidence is only admissible on behalf of plaintiffs but holding that
defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to permit such evidence on behalf
of defendant).
60. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5273, at 37.
61. Id.; see also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, MODERN
EVIDENCE § 4.24 (1995); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, § 195, at 826.
62. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5273, at 37; MUELLER &
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 61, § 4.24, at 285.
63. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5273, at 25 (noting the probability
theory of habit and contrasting it with the stimuli-response theory).
64. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, § 195, at 825.
65. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5273, at 37.
66. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, § 195, at 825.
67. See id. § 189, at 795 (noting that most courts reject such evidence but stating that
some admit it "under the guise of evidence of 'habit[]' when there were no eyewitnesses
to the event") (citing Pritchett v. Steinker Trucking Co., 247 N.E.2d 923, 926-27 (I11.
App. 4th Dist. 1969)).
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noted, "[c]haracter and habit occupy different areas on the same
continuum" 6 and are, therefore, "easily confused." 69 Regardless of
the reason, the careful habits cases are best understood as instances in
which the courts took advantage of the lack of clear definitions of
"habit" and "character" to carve out a narrow exception to the ban on
character evidence to assist plaintiffs who could not otherwise meet
their burden of proving due care.7'
For many years, the careful habits/eyewitness cases co-existed with
a parallel line of cases that admitted evidence more closely akin to true
habit evidence. For example, in 1929, the appellate court, in Wolf v.
Peoples Bank,71 held that the trial court erred in excluding testimony
about the deceased's "habit[s] and custom[s] about expenditures of
money., 72 The court stated that "[aippellant should have been given
the widest latitude, under the law, to bring out every fact and
circumstance which had any material bearing upon the merits of the
controversy. 73 Even though the evidence at issue in Wolf was not
true habit evidence, the court quoted extensively from various sources
that mentioned the probative value and general admissibility of habit
evidence. 74
Wolf suggests that, for a long time, Illinois courts implicitly
recognized a difference between the progeny of Clark (the careful
68. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 61, § 4.24, at 285-86 (stating that the more
a behavior can be said to be specific, regular, and unreflective, the more likely it is to
qualify as habit).
69. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, § 195, at 825.
70. See Brown v. Nale, 245 N.E.2d 9, 11-12 (II1. App. 4th Dist. 1969) (stating that
"one purpose of evidence as to habits of care as an exception to the general rule in civil
cases is to make available such evidence of freedom from contributory negligence as
would meet the traditional element of the cause of action and avoid a directed verdict").
71. 255 I11. App. 127 (3d Dist. 1929).
72. Id. at 155.
73. Id. at 156.
74. See id. at 150-51 (citing Walker v. Barron, 6 Minn. 508, 515 (1861); State v.
Manchester & L.R.R., 52 N.H. 528 (1873); SIMON GREENLEAF, I TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 14j, at 53 (16th ed. 1899); JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 1 A TREATISE ON THE
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 92, at 166 (1904)); cf. Hunter v.
Harris, 23 N.E. 626, 628 (III. 1890) (finding that on the question of whether a note was
genuine, the court should have received evidence of various transactions between the
parties "out of which a liability could have arisen"). A few cases after Wolf took a
similar approach. See, e.g., Solomon v. The Fair, 183 N.E.2d 588, 589 (I11. App. 1st
Dist. 1962) (holding that trial court did not err in permitting defendant deliveryman,
who could not recall delivering bedframe on which plaintiff was injured and could not tell
the court whether he or his helper delivered it, to testify as to his "custom and habit with
respect to due care and caution in making other similar deliveries" and to testify that he
placed bedframes wherever directed by those receiving them).
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habits cases) and the progeny of Haggard (habits of other kinds).75
Eventually, however, the careful habits cases began to swallow the
rule announced in the early cases. As a result, some courts said that
the only kind of habit evidence that could be admitted was evidence of
careful habits when offered in personal injury or wrongful death
actions where there were no eyewitnesses.76
2. The Eyewitness Rule
Clark and its progeny limited the use of careful habits evidence to
cases where there were no eyewitnesses-who could testify to whether a
plaintiff exercised the required due care necessary for recovery in a
negligence action.77 Initially, the eyewitness rule applied only to
careful habits evidence, as demonstrated by the fact that Haggard,
Stolp, and Thorp did not apply the rule to other kinds of habit
evidence. Consequently, in Wolf, the court made no mention of the
eyewitness rule. Eventually, however, the eyewitness rule spilled
over into cases involving true habit evidence. For example, in 1980,
the appellate court held that evidence of an anesthesiologist's habits in
monitoring breathing during surgery was not admissible because there
75. See supra notes 39-59 and accompanying text (discussing the careful habits
cases); supra notes 13, 24-38 (discussing habits of other kinds).
76. See, e.g., Gardner v. Geraghty, 423 N.E.2d 1321, 1324-25 (I11. App. 1st Dist.
1981) (holding that even though the general rule is not to admit habit testimony, an
exception exists in wrongful death cases and the trial court should have admitted
testimony regarding decedent's careful habits).
77. The exact scope of the eyewitness rule is unclear. Some cases hold that habit
evidence is rendered inadmissible by the presence of eyewitnesses even if those
witnesses are of questionable reliability. See, e.g., Plank v. Holman, 264 N.E.2d 12,
14-15 (II!. 1970) (finding that although the plaintiff did not see everything that occurred
at the scene of accident in which her husband was killed, "[ijf the plaintiff could relate
circumstances from which the decedent's behavior and operation of his automobile
might be reasonably inferred, she may be termed an 'eyewitness' and stating that
because plaintiff was an eyewitness to the accident, she was "compelled to call herself
[to prove his due care] in the absence of other direct testimony"); Herget Nat'l Bank v.
Johnson, 316 N.E.2d 191, 194 (II!. App. 3d Dist. 1974) (witness' mental deficiency is
relevant "only in so far as it affects the weight to be given his testimony" and "it is not
necessary that an eyewitness see everything that occurred at the accident scene").
Other cases suggest that evidence of careful habits may be received if an eyewitness
has no recollection whatsoever of the events that he observed or if there are no
witnesses who can testify to the precise issue on which the evidence is offered. See,
e.g., Bitner v. Central Illinois Light Co., 394 N.E.2d 492 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1979)
(holding that when witness to an accident lacked recollection of the accident, the
witness could not be classified as a competent eyewitness; thus, the evidence of
decedent's careful habits should have been permitted); Hall v. Kirk, 300 N.E.2d 600, 603
(Ill. App. 5th Dist. 1973) (holding that evidence of plaintiff's careful habits was
properly admitted to show he was not the driver where no direct evidence existed to show
who was driving vehicle involved in accident and eyewitnesses to the accident did not
see who was driving).
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were eyewitnesses to the operation that resulted in injury to the
plaintiff.78 Thus, although Illinois courts originally imposed the
eyewitness rule to limit the use of careful habits evidence, a kind of
character evidence, by 1980 they had stood the rule on its head by
stating that even true habit evidence was inadmissible unless there
were no eyewitnesses.
3. Bradfield and its Progeny: Emerging Approaches
In 1985, in Bradfield v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Co.,79 the
appellate court took a new approach, suggesting a much more
permissive attitude towards the use of habit evidence. Bradfield
involved a wrongful death action that arose when defendant's train
struck a car driven by plaintiff's decedent at a grade crossing.80 The
appellate court held that the trial court did not err in allowing
decedent's wife and son to testify that, on prior occasions, other
Illinois Central Gulf Railroad Company train crews failed to sound a
whistle or horn when approaching the crossing in question.8"
The Bradfield court recognized that it was dealing with evidence of
routine practices, rather than evidence of habit.82 However, the court
noted that Illinois' traditional rule of limiting habit evidence to cases
without any eyewitnesses had often "been criticized because its
premise is the 'superior' reliability of eyewitness testimony."' The
court then purported to adopt "the better rule" set forth in Rule 406 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence,' 4 which provides:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of
an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of
the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the
78. See Vuletich v. Bolgla, 407 N.E.2d 566 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1980); see also City
of Salem v. Webster, 61 N.E. 323, 324 (I11. 1901) (holding in a personal injury action
that defendant's evidence that plaintiff was ordinarily a rapid driver was inadmissible
because "direct testimony [existed] as to the rate at which plaintiff was driving,"
rendering the offered evidence "not competent"); Pellico v. Jackson, 217 N.E.2d 281,
288-89 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1966) (stating that "[the general rule in this state is that
general habits are admissible only where there are no eyewitnesses to the occurrence,"
but noting that the Illinois cases deal only with general habits of due care of a decedent).
79. 484 N.E.2d 365 (I11. App. 5th Dist. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 505 N.E.2d
231 (111. 1987).
80. See id. at 366.
81. See id. at 367-68.
82. See id. The court stated, "[W]e are not dealing with the habits of specific
individuals but with the routine practice of an organization ..... Id. at 367.
83. Id. at 367. The court went on to observe that even though it was dealing not with
habit evidence but evidence of "the routine practice of an organization," the same
shortcomings of the "eyewitness" requirement held true. Id.
84. See id. at 367-68.
398 [Vol. 29
1998] Evidence of Habit and Routine Practice 399
conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion
was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.8 5
In affirming the appellate court's decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court acknowledged that its decision in Haggard made "it questionable
whether the [eyewitness cases] are in point."'  However, it neither
adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 406 nor definitively rejected the
eyewitness rule.87 With these indecisive actions, the supreme court
cut the law governing habit evidence loose from its traditional
moorings and cast it adrift without a rudder.
As a result, post-Bradfield appellate decisions have taken a variety
of approaches. In civil cases, several post-Bradfield decisions have
rejected the eyewitness rule and stated that Illinois has adopted Federal
Rule of Evidence 406.88 Other decisions have placed traditional
restrictions on the introduction of such evidence.'
85. FED. R. EvID. 406.
86. Bradfield v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 505 N.E.2d 331, 333-34 (II1. 1987).
See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of Haggard.
87. See Bradfield, 505 N.E.2d at 334 (holding that defendant failed to preserve for
review the question of the propriety of the admission of habit testimony by objecting
only to the relevance of such evidence).
88. See, e.g., Alvarado v. Goepp, 663 N.E.2d 63, 64-65 (Iil. App. Ist Dist. 1996)
(rejecting the eyewitness rule and stating that Illinois courts have adopted Federal Rule
of Evidence 406, but holding that habit evidence should not have been admitted because
plaintiff failed to lay a sufficient foundation for it); Hajian v. Holy Family Hosp., 652
N.E.2d 1132, 1140 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1995) (noting that Illinois courts had adopted
Federal Rule of Evidence 406 and holding that where patient's mother testified that she
had asked a nurse to check on patient but the nurse did not do so, the trial court did not err
in allowing nurse to testify that her habit was to respond to patient and family requests
for her attention); Taruc v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 578 N.E.2d 134, 138 (Ill.
App. 1st Dist. 1991) (holding that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of
normal office procedures, and stating that "[miore recent cases ... have recognized that
Federal Rule 406 states the proper formulation of the relevance (and thus admissibility)
of habit evidence"); Wasleff v. Dever, 550 N.E.2d 1132, 1137 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1990)
(stating that "our courts have adopted Rule 406 . . . which establishes that habit
evidence is always admissible for the purpose of proving the conduct of a person or
business organization" and holding that the trial court did not err in admitting testimony
of trustee's daughter that she routinely signed her father's name to checks and
withdrawals while handling his financial affairs); see also Collins v. Roseland
Community Hosp., 579 N.E.2d 1105, 1109 (II1. App. 1st Dist. 1991) (holding that
"[e]vidence of routine or habit is admissible to prove that the conduct of the person was
in conformity with [the] habit or routine practice").
89. See, e.g., Knecht v. Radiac Abrasives, Inc., 579 N.E.2d 1248, 1253 (Il1. App.
5th Dist. 1991) (cautioning against easy admission of habit testimony and observing
that many Illinois cases have conditioned the admission of habit evidence on a showing
of a "strong necessity for its reception"); Cairns v. Hansen, 524 N.E.2d 939, 945-46
(Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1988) (observing that the Illinois Supreme Court has not clearly
rejected the eyewitness rule and noting that the "established rule of law in Illinois"
provides that in wrongful death cases, where the plaintiff must show that the deceased
exercised due care for his own safety at the time of the occurrence, evidence of prior
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In criminal cases, Bradfield has had a more definitive impact. Prior
to Bradfield, Illinois courts only rarely approved of habit evidence in
criminal cases. 90 However, in 1988, in the case of People v.
careful habits, if pertinent, may be admitted as tending to prove the exercise of due care
if there are no competent eyewitnesses). The Cairns court also held that because a
competent eyewitness was available, habit testimony to prove defendant's due care was
inadmissible. See id. at 945-46. Moreover, the court found that the witness' testimony
that she had ridden with decedent every day for some time, that he was careful and did not
drink, and that he was driving carefully the night of the accident was too indefinite and
ambiguous to establish that the decedent, as a matter of habit, met a specific situation
with a specific response. See id.
90. In Gallagher v. People, 11 N.E. 335, 336 (Ill. 1887), the defendant was charged
with selling intoxicating liquor to "persons in the habit of getting intoxicated. The
court held that the trial court did not err in permitting a witness to answer that persons
alleged to be "in the habit of getting intoxicated" were in such habit. Id.
In People v. Moretti, 129 N.E.2d 709, 713 (I11. 1955), the defendant, charged with
murder, claimed that the victim's death occurred while the defendant was trying to defend
himself against an attack by a third person. The Moretti court stated that it could receive
evidence of the alleged attacker's violent character and habits to show who was the first
aggressor, but held that the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence because the
defense witness called to testify to the attacker's reputation was not familiar with that
reputation. See id. at 725-26. The court did not mention the eyewitness rule; but,
because of Moretti's focus on proof by evidence of reputation, the question before the
court appears to have been the admissibility of character evidence and the word "habit"
seems to have been used loosely as a synonym for character. See id; see also People v.
West, 429 N.E.2d 599, 603 (Ii. App. 2d Dist. 1981) (holding as harmless error the
admission of witness' testimony about her usual practices when she admitted that she
had no detailed knowledge of the occasion in question) (citing Salem v. Webster, 61
N.E. 323 (Ill. 1901); Goetz v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 328 N.E.2d 109 (II1. App. 1st
Dist. 1975)).
Courts in other jurisdictions often allow evidence that a homicide victim habitually
carried a weapon or engaged in other behaviors that suggest a propensity for violence.
See, e.g., Naugher v. State, 23 So. 26, 27 (Ala. 1898) (holding that testimony of
defendant's knowledge about whether the deceased habitually carried a gun was
permissible because it might shed light on the circumstances of the shooting). The
limited use of this kind of habit evidence in Illinois in cases of this kind may flow in
part from the fact that Illinois, unlike many other jurisdictions, allows proof of specific
instances of conduct to prove a homicide victim's character for violence. See, e.g.,
People v. Lynch, 470 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (I11. 1984) (stating that when theory of self-
defense was raised, victim's aggressive and violent character is relevant to show who
was the aggressor); People v. Peeler, 299 N.E.2d 382, 386 (II!. App. 1st Dist. 1973)
(ruling that in homicide prosecutions where defendant argues self-defense and where the
aggressor is in question, evidence of decedent's prior threats and violent disposition
towards the defendant is admissible). Evidence of a victim's violent habits is thus rarely
necessary in Illinois criminal cases. Cf. People v. Charles, 606 N.E.2d 603, 610 (III.
App. 1st Dist. 1992) (citing with apparent approval United States v. Weddell, 890 F.2d
106, 107-08 (8th Cir. 1989) and stating that the case stood for the proposition that
evidence of defendant's general habit of using knives was admissible to rebut his claim
that he was defending himself when he stabbed his victim); People v. Meares El, 403
N.E.2d 547, 553 (II!. App. 1st Dist. 1980) (finding the distinction between evidence of
habit and evidence of character irrelevant because, in either event, it was harmless error
to admit testimony that the witness knew that the defendant carried a knife).
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Miller,9' the appellate court suggested that habit evidence was
admissible. 92 In 1989, in People v. Galbreath,93 a drunk-driving
prosecution, the state sought to establish the proper administration of a
blood test through evidence of a medical technician's habitual practices
when performing such tests. 94 The trial court granted defendant's
motion to exclude the evidence,95 and the state appealed pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). 96 The appellate court, relying on
Miller, held that the exclusion of this evidence was reversible error; it
made no mention of the eyewitness rule. 9 Since Galbreath, other
appellate decisions have also approved the use of habit evidence in
criminal cases.'
91. 519 N.E.2d 717 (I11. App. 3d Dist. 1988).
92. See id. at 720 (setting out requirements for admission of habit evidence but
holding that five to seven examples of conduct were insufficient to establish habit).
The Miller court cited the Model Code of Evidence Rule 307(1) and a 1977 United
States Court of Appeals decision, Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494,
511 (4th Cir. 1977). Miller, 519 N.E.2d at 720. It made no reference to any Illinois
cases in support of its position and held that the evidence in question was inadmissible
because it "[did] not amount to a habit, but only instances of similar conduct." Id.; cf.
People v. Brooks, 474 N.E.2d 1287 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1985) (stating the general rule
that "a court will not consider evidence that a person has, or has not, done a certain act at
a particular time as probative of a contention that he has, or has not, done a similar act
at another time").
93. 538 N.E.2d 200 (II1. App. 4th Dist. 1989).
94. See id. at 202.
95. See id. at 202-03.
96. ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 604(a)(1).
97. See Galbreath, 538 N.E.2d at 202. The Galbreath court found that the trial court
erred in excluding a witness' testimony that she drew approximately 100 blood samples
per week, was familiar with the procedures, and had never deviated from them. See id.
The testimony was admissible as evidence of the routine practice of an organization
because it was corroborated by the testimony of the arresting officer. Id. The testimony
was also admissible as evidence of habit because the procedure was performed often
enough to be called a habit and was "similar enough to the alleged conduct." Id. (quoting
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, CLEARY & GRAHAM'S HANDBOOK OF ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 406.4, at
55 (4th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1989)).
98. See, e.g., People v. Randle, 661 N.E.2d 370, 379 (III. App. Ist Dist. 1995)
(holding that in establishing that a murder victim was robbed, the trial court properly
received circumstantial evidence to establish that the victim habitually received and kept
cash in her home), reh'g denied, 661 N.E.2d 370 (III. App. Ist Dist. 1996), and appeal
denied, 667 N.E.2d 1061 (III. 1996); People v. Keller, 641 N.E.2d 891, 896 (III. App.
Ist Dist. 1994) (holding that if a proper foundation was laid, the trial court could in its
discretion admit evidence that a shopkeeper habitually or customarily kept large
amounts of cash on his person and in his cash register).
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D. Evidence of Routine Business Practice
Routine business practice refers to the behavior of a group or
organization that would be termed habit if engaged in by an
individual. 99 Routine practices generally- involve probabilities rather
than semiautomatic responses stimulated by specific events. The
Illinois Appellate Court has stated that "[t]he types of conduct
qualifying for admission as a routine business practice are ministerial
acts: mailing, filing, sending notice, and the like, "and-not:
discretionary acts such as treating employees fairly."' °
Evidence of a routine practice is relevant and highly probative when
offered to show that the conduct of an organization on a particular
occasion conformed to that practice. Perhaps because it is seen as
more reliable than habit evidence, Illinois courts have generally not
limited the use of routine practice evidence by the eyewitness rule.'0 '
However, Illinois courts have imposed a different kind of limitation.
Traditionally, Illinois courts have limited the use of routine practice
evidence to cases where other evidence, including eyewitnesses, could
corroborate a claim that a group or organization followed the practice
in question in the particular case."
The inconsistencies and definitional problems that have led to so
much confusion in the law governing habit evidence have not plagued
the law governing evidence of routine practices. Here too, however,
the winds of change are blowing. In recent years, Illinois courts have
started to follow Federal Rule of Evidence 406, which rejects any
corroboration requirements, and have been allowing evidence of
routine practice in the absence of corroboration. Thus, in 1987, in
99. FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee's note.
100. Knecht v. Radiac Abrasives, Inc., 579 N.E.2d 1248, 1254 (I11. App. 5th Dist.
1991).
101. See, e.g., Craftsmen Fin. Co. v. Landfield Fin. Co., 129 N.E.2d 773, 773 (I11.
App. 1st Dist. 1955) (stating that in an action to recover money allegedly loaned and
profits resulting from that loan, "permitting witness to testify to a series of similar
business ventures . . . was not error") (abstract published only); see also 23 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5272, at 14 n. 10 (stating that "[tlhe no-eyewitness rule only
applied to habits of individuals"); Note: Evidence-Relevancy-Admission of Habit
Evidence to Show Due Care, 10 VAND. L. REV. 447, 448-49 (1957).
102. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Oss, 468 N.E.2d 439, 442 (III.
App. 1st Dist. 1984); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 407
N.E.2d 1088, 1090 (II1. App. 2d Dist.- 1980); Lynn v. Village of W. City, 345 N.E.2d.
172, 175 (II. App. 5th Dist. 1976); Goetz v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 328 N.E.2d 109,
115 (I11. App. 2d Dist. 1975); State Bank v. Standaert, 82 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ill. App. 2d
Dist 1948); cf. Meyer v. Krug, 19 N.E.2d 111, 111 (III. App. 1st Dist. 1939) (holding
that "[e]vidence that insurance agent[] . . . placed letters addressed to defendant in a pile
of letters to be mailed by [it] was insufficient to raise presumption that letters were
mailed and received by defendant") (abstract published only).
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Webb v. Angell,'03 the appellate court found no error in the admission
of evidence of routine practice, stating that "[elvidence of the routine
practice of an organization is relevant to prove that the actions of the
organization on a specific occasion conformed to the routine. ' 4 The
court further stated that if there was evidence that "the routine was not
followed on a particular occasion, it is up to the jury to resolve the
conflict.' ' -5 Similarly, in the 1991 case of Taruc v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co.,' 6 the appellate court stated that "[m]ore
recent cases . . . have recognized that Federal Rule 406 states the
proper formulation of the relevance (and thus admissibility) of habit
evidence.' ' 10 7 The court implied that showing that the practice was
followed on the occasion in question was unnecessary, holding that
the evidence "established a relevant and admissible routine businesspractice. ' 08
III. METHODS OF PROOF
Habits and routine practices are usually proved through the
testimony of witnesses who have observed the behavior in question.,o9
A reasonably large number of instances must be shown," and the
testimony must be specific."' Generally, testimony that a person
103. 508 N.E.2d 508 (I11. App. 2d Dist. 1987).
104. Id. at 517. But cf. Knecht, 579 N.E,2d at 1253 (rejecting evidence, in part,
because there was no corroborating proof).
105. Webb, 508 N.E.2d at 517; see also Kolias v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
500 N.E.2d 502, 506 (I!1. App. 1st Dist. 1986) (holding that direct evidence of actual
mailing was unnecessary when presence of routine was shown).
106. 578 N.E.2d 134 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1991).
107. Id. at 138.
108. Id.; see also Small v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 617 N.E.2d 80, 83 (I11. App. 1st
Dist. 1993) (finding evidence of routine practice of company relevant and admissible to
prove that the company's actions on a specific occasion conformed to that practice).
109. See, e.g., Hajian v. Holy Family Hosp., 652 N.E.2d 1132, 1140 (I11. App. Ist
Dist. 1995) (holding that the trial court did not err in allowing a nurse to testify about
her habit of responding to patient and family requests for her attention because her
testimony "contained sufficiently detailed and specific facts so the court could infer
[that] her testimony ... was reliable and not mere speculation or conjecture"); People v.
Galbreath, 538 N.E.2d 200, 202 (I11. App. 4th Dist. 1989) (holding that witness'
testimony that she drew approximately 100 blood samples per week, was familiar with
procedures, and never deviated from them, was sufficient to establish habit and to secure
admission of blood-alcohol test results).
110. See People v. Miller, 519 N.E.2d 717, 720 (Ill. App. 3d Dist. 1988) (finding
five to seven instances insufficient to establish habit); see also Roherty v. Green, 206
N.E.2d 756, 761 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1965) (stating that a single similar transaction
"cannot be raised to the status of a custom or method of doing business").
I 11. See Alvarado v. Goepp, 663 N.E.2d 63, 64-65 (I11. App. 1st Dist. 1996)
(holding testimony that a dentist "often" failed to have a treatment plan was
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often does something,"I2 or evidence of a few "instances of similar
conduct" is inadmissible to prove or disprove present conduct."l
3
It has sometimes been suggested that habit and routine practice
cannot or should not be proved by opinion evidence." 4 This
suggestion seems correct if a witness simply speculates and lacks
personal knowledge of the behavior in question." 5 In such a case,
opinion testimony, if allowed, could enable the witness to give
testimony without risking prosecution for perjury.'6 However,
opinion testimony seems unobjectionable if the witness cannot
remember or cannot relate every specific instance of the relevant
behavior but simply expresses an opinion as a shorthand way of
inadmissible because it was "vague, general, and ambiguous"); Cairns v. Hansen, 524
N.E.2d 939, 946 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1988) (holding that testimony that witness rode
with decedent every day for a period of time before the accident, that decedent was careful
and did not drink, that the witness was with him the night of the accident and that he
drove carefully and slowly was far too ambiguous and general to establish a habit of the
decedent). Specific instances could, in theory, be shown through circumstantial
evidence, by the use of documents, or even by opinion testimony. 23 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5276, at 67.
The testimony of a single credible witness is clearly sufficient to establish a habit.
See, e.g., Hajian, 652 N.E.2d at 1140.
112. See Alvarado, 663 N.E.2d at 64-65 (finding it was reversible error to admit
testimony that a dentist "often" failed to have a treatment plan for patients because
"[tlhere were no specifics, no numbers, no testimony about the kind of patient or kind of
treatment involved ... [and] no time parameters").
113. Miller, 519 N.E.2d at 720; see also Roherty, 206 N.E.2d at 761 (holding that
"[wihile it is generally true that evidence can be introduced in a proper case to show a
manner or custom of doing business, [defendant's two] payments cannot be raised to the
status of a custom or method of doing business"); cf. Traff v. Fabro, 84 N.E.2d 874, 877
(Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1949) (finding proof of "isolated instances is not sufficient to
establish a usage or custom").
114. See Knecht v. Radiac Abrasives, Inc., 579 N.E.2d 1248, 1252 (I11. App. 5th
Dist. 1991) (finding that lay opinion testimony "was not proper evidence of habit or
routine practice"); see also 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5271, at 9 n.5
(listing lawyers groups that opposed the use of opinion evidence to prove habit or
routine practice). See generally FED. R. EvID. 406 advisory committee's note (neither
rejecting nor sanctioning opinion evidence to prove habit).
115. Cf. 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5276, at 72-73 (stating that "[t]he
lay witness who wishes to 'generalize' under the Federal Rules must, of course, show that
his opinion or generalization is based on his personal knowledge"). But cf, United
States v. Quezada, 754 F.2d 1190, 1195-96 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the existence
of a routine practice may be proved through the testimony of someone familiar with the
practice and need not be proved by direct personal observation). See generally FED. R.
EVID. 406 advisory committee's note (neither rejecting nor sanctioning opinion
evidence to prove habit).
116. See 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5272, at 3 (Supp. 1994) (citing
Weinisch v. Sawyer, 567 A.2d 259, 264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (rejecting this
argument and finding that defendant's testimony of his own habit or custom in
conducting business was properly admitted), rev'd on other grounds, 587 A.2d 615 (N.J.
1991)).
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summarizing his own observations." 7
Some authorities suggest that evidence of reputation may be used to
prove habit." 8 Evidence of reputation, however, is necessarily
hearsay and the law does not recognize a hearsay exception for
reputation evidence used to prove habit." 9 In Illinois, evidence of
reputation is the only way to prove a trait of character where offered to
prove conduct consistent therewith.' 20 Ordinarily, Illinois does not
allow evidence in the form of opinion or specific instances to prove
character. '2'
Part of the confusion between character and habit in the early cases
may flow from these different methods of proof. In most Illinois
cases purporting to deal with "habit" evidence, the "habit" in question
appears to have been proved by a witness' opinion or by evidence of
specific instances of conduct observed by a witness. 22  When
reputation evidence was used, courts usually treated the evidence as
character evidence, and barred its use. 23 However, when opinion
evidence was used, courts did not recognize the evidence as character
evidence, naming it instead as evidence of "habit" or "custom."' 24
117. See Hajian v. Holy Family Hospital, 652 N.E.2d 1132, 1140 (I11. App. 1st
Dist. 1995) (finding that the trial court properly admitted nurse's testimony as to her
own habits "which contained sufficiently detailed and specific facts so the court could
infer her testimony . . .was reliable and not mere speculation or conjecture"); see also
Gallagher v. People, 11 N.E. 335, 336 (Ill. 1887) (noting that the law "forbids the
opinions or conclusions of witnesses from being given in evidence; but whether or not a
person possesses a certain habit is rather a question of fact than of opinion or
conclusion").
118. See Travers v. Snyder, 38 II. App. 379, 387 (2d Dist. 1890) (stating that it
was proper for appellee to "show by his witness ... the habits of appellee in regard to
giving his notes, but . . . the inquiry should be confined to his general reputation in that
regard"); cf. Brown v. Nale, 245 N.E.2d 9, 11 (111. App. 4th Dist. 1969) (finding that the
trial court erred in admitting evidence of reputation to prove habits of due care).
119. Cf. FED. R. EvID. 803(21) (recognizing a hearsay exception for evidence of
reputation used to prove character, but saying nothing about habit).
120. See People v. Willy, 133 N.E. 859, 864 (I11. 1921).
121. See id.; cf. FED. R. EvID. 405 (permitting opinion evidence to prove character).
122. See supra notes 109 and 117 (citing cases dealing with proof of habit by
opinion or evidence of specific instances). Even "careful habits" have generally been
shown by testimony as to specific instances. See Brown, 245 N.E.2d at 11.
123. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Hoy, 8 N.E. 832, 832-33 (Ii. 1886); Brown, 245
N.E.2d at 11 (noting that only two Illinois cases "referred to reputation of habits of due
care" and holding that it was error to allow plaintiff to introduce evidence of reputation
to habits of due care); McBean v. Fox, 1 111. App. 177, 186-87 (1st Dist. 1878). But cf.
Travers, 38 Ill. App. at 387.
124. See Thorp v. Goewey, 85 II1. 611, 614 (1897) (failing to note method of
proof, but apparently evidence of one specific instance was introduced).
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IV. STRAIGHTENING OUT THE MESS-THE NEED FOR FEDERAL
RULE OF EVIDENCE 406
A. Habits and Careful Habits
True habit evidence, evidence of semiautomatic behavior on other
similar occasions, can be highly probative of conduct on a particular
occasion. The often unconscious nature and unvarying regularity of
habits strongly suggest the likelihood of repetition. Furthermore,
because evidence of habit is not like!y to mislead the trier of fact or
precipitate a decision on an emotional or other improper basis, it will
rarely be inadmissible if it is relevant."2
In contrast, careful habits evidence, like all character evidence, is of
limited probative value. 12 6 People often behave in ways inconsistent
with their character. More often, they behave in ways inconsistent
with their reputations, the usual means of proving character. Because
character may change over time, evidence of a character trait on one
occasion may not be probative of conduct on another occasion. 127
Moreover, character evidence may "distract the minds of the jury from
the principal question,"" may be given excessive weight by the jury,
and may lead the jury to make judgments on the basis of past, rather
than present character.129 For these reasons, and because the character
125. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, § 195, at 826. Some evidence
scholars have argued that habit evidence might be objectionable for the following
reasons. "IF]irst, . . . individuals can consciously take advantage of the fact that they
are known to have certain habits .... second .... even well established habits do not
always govern behavior . . . [and] third, habit evidence is . . . particularly easy to
fabricate and particularly difficult to refute." RICHARD 0. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 249-50 (2d ed. 1982). None of these
arguments is persuasive. The first point is true of anything- individuals can always
take advantage of facts about themselves to try to avoid responsibility. The second
point goes to the weight of the evidence. The third point is true of many kinds of
evidence, including eyewitness testimony.
126. See David P. Leonard, The Use of Character to Prove Conduct: Rationality and
Catharsis in the Law of Evidence, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 26-31 (1987) (discussing
psychological research as it relates to people's perception of habitual behavior).
127. But cf. Miguel A. Mendez, Essay: The Law of Evidence and the Search for a
Stable Personality, 45 EMORY L.J. 221, 234 (1996) (noting new research which
suggests that basic personality structures are relatively stable and unvarying).
128. Kelly v. People, 82 N.E. 198, 200 (I11. 1907) (citing State v. Potter, 13 Kan.
414 (1874)); see also Holzman v. Hoy, 8 N.E. 832, 833 (111. 1886) (holding character
evidence inadmissible because its bearing upon the issue in question "is too remote, and
in many, if not most, cases it would tend to mislead the jury, rather than enlighten
them").
129. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 5.2, at 132
(3d ed. 1996); see also People v. Randle, 498 N.E.2d 732, 736 (Iil. App. 2d Dist. 1986)
(stating that the bar on character evidence exists "because it is feared that the jury will be
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traits that parties seek to expose are often highly prejudicial,"3 °
character evidence is disfavored.
The use of careful habits evidence grew out of Illinois' requirement
that personal injury plaintiffs must prove due care and show the
absence of contributory negligence to recover for injuries caused by
the negligence of others. By carving out an exception to the usual ban
on character evidence and allowing some plaintiffs to introduce
evidence of careful habits in their case-in-chief, the Illinois Supreme
Court has provided plaintiffs, who could not otherwise prove that they
were without fault, an opportunity to get their case before a jury.131
The development of tort law in Illinois since 1980 has greatly
reduced the need for careful habits evidence in personal injury
lawsuits. In 1981, in Alvis v. Ribar,3 2 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not bar him from
recovery for an injury, 133 and adopted a rule of comparative
negligence, which allows partial recovery even if the plaintiff is found
at fault."3 As a result, evidence of careful habits may help the plaintiff
win a larger award, but it will rarely be necessary to a recovery.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see any reason, except
blind adherence to precedent, for Illinois courts to continue to allow
the use of one kind of character evidence, careful habits evidence,
while barring other kinds of character evidence.
The adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 406 would clarify the
relevance of true habit evidence when offered to prove conduct
consistent with the habit shown. Rule 406, however, does not define
"habit," and other jurisdictions have taken conflicting positions on the
question of whether evidence of "careful habits" falls under the rule.1
35
Although, the adoption of Rule 406 would not, therefore, determine
the relevance or admissibility of careful habits evidence, such evidence
swayed to convict based not on a defendant's actual guilt ... but because the defendant is
a bad person").
130. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, § 195, at 825 n.3.
131. See supra notes 39-59 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois cases
upholding this exception to the usual ban on character evidence).
132. 421 N.E.2d 886 (111. 1981). In 1986 this case was subsequently superseded by
statute. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1116 (West 1994) (enacting a modified version of
comparative negligence).
133. See id. at 898.
134. See id.
135. See, e.g., 23 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 11, § 5273, at 36-37 (1980)
(noting conflicting and inconsistent approaches to the issue). The adoption of Federal
Rule of Evidence 404, which bars the use of character evidence to prove conduct except
in limited circumstances in criminal cases, would bar careful habits evidence if that kind
of evidence were viewed, as it should be, as evidence of character. FED. R. EVID. 404.
19981 407
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is of little probable value and should be barred if offered only to show
conduct consistent with the character trait shown.
136
B. The Eyewitness Rule
Courts have generally found that character evidence "should only be
admitted when absolutely essential to the discovery of the truth."'37 In
accord with this approach, the eyewitness rule, as announced in the
careful habits cases, limits the use of careful habits evidence, a kind of
character evidence, to circumstances where it is absolutely essential.'3
The eyewitness rule should be confined to the circumstances that gave
rise to it. A rule designed to limit the use of unreliable, last resort,
character evidence, should never have been expanded to bar true habit
evidence-evidence of an entirely different kind-which is often very
reliable.
As a matter of policy, the eyewitness rule makes little sense in any
context. Eyewitness testimony is hardly the most reliable sort of
testimony. Perceptions and memories are often inaccurate.' 3 9 Even
the best observers may be biased or have an interest in the matter being
litigated. Moreover, the need for habit evidence is not reduced where
eyewitnesses disagree or where, for some other reason, the issue to
which the habit evidence relates is in doubt.140
Federal Rule of Evidence 406 expressly abolishes the eyewitness
rule where true habit evidence is concerned. However, Rule 406 only
effects the eyewitness rule as it applies to evidence of careful habits, if
such evidence is deemed habit evidence within the meaning of that
rule. 14 1
136. See Cairns v. Hansen, 524 N.E.2d 939, 945 (II1. App. 2d Dist. 1988) (stating
that the resolution of this question is for the supreme court).
137. Kelly v. People, 82 N.E. 198, 200 (Ii. 1907) (citing State v. Potter, 13 Kan.
414 (1871)); Holzman v. Hoy, 8 N.E. 832, 833 (II1. 1886) (holding character evidence
inadmissible because its bearing upon the issue in question "is too remote, and in many,
if not most, cases it would tend to mislead the jury, rather than enlighten them").
138. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing the limitation of the
use of careful habits evidence to circumstances in which it is essential).
139. LEMPERT AND SALTZBURG, supra note 125, at 168 (citing Robert Buckhout,
Eyewitness Testimony, 231 Sci. AM. 23-31 (1974)).
140. See I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 17, § 195, at 828 n.16; see, e.g.
Sawyer v. Fleming, 83 N.E.2d 360, 361 (I11. App. 2d Dist. 1949) (reasoning that
plaintiff was properly barred from introducing evidence of careful habits of deceased
because defendant offered two eyewitnesses who "had been thoroughly discredited").
141. See Howard T. Brinton, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: Pointing the
Way to Needed Changes in Illinois, 5 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 242, 261 (1972)
(arguing that Federal Rule of Evidence 406 should be adopted in Illinois because it will
abolish the eyewitness rule where careful habits testimony is offered).
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C. Routine Practices and the Corroboration Requirement
The adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 406 would eliminate the
requirement of corroboration of evidence of routine business
practices. 42 The corroboration requirement bars routine practice
testimony in the cases where it is most needed, where there are no
eyewitnesses. Thus, the corroboration requirement is inconsistent
with the eyewitness rule. Moreover, a lack of corroboration does not
reduce the probative value or relevance of the evidence; it simply
affects its weight. If the corroboration requirement is premised, as
seems likely, on a mistrust of routine practice evidence, that mistrust
should go to weight, not admissibility. The evidence should be
received and given whatever weight the trier of fact believes it
deserves.
D. Method of Proof
The adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 406 should have no effect
on the methods used to prove habit and routine practice. When
originally proposed, Rule 406 provided that habit or routine practice
could be proved by testimony "in the form of an opinion or by specific
instances of conduct."' 43 Subsequently, that provision was removed,
based on the rationale "that the method of proof of habit and routine
practice should be left to the courts to deal with on a case-by-case
basis." 44
V. CONCLUSION
Federal Rule of Evidence 406 embodies the principle that evidence
of a person's habit or an organization's routine practice is highly
probative when offered to show that the conduct of the person or
organization on a particular occasion conformed to the habit or
practice. The Illinois Supreme Court should clearly and unequivocally
adopt Federal Rule of Evidence 406 and make such evidence
admissible on the same terms as other relevant evidence.
Careful habits evidence presents special problems. In reality, it is a
kind of character evidence, and generally, evidence of character is not
admissible in civil cases to prove conduct consistent with the trait of
142. See supra text accompanying note 102 (explaining that Illinois has limited the
use of routine business practice evidence to cases where there is corroborating evidence,
resulting in confusion in the law).
143. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 5 (1973). reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075,
7079.
144. Id.
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character shown. With the elimination of the contributory negligence
bar on recovery in personal injury cases, plaintiffs no longer need to
plead and prove freedom from contributory negligence in order to
recover. 45 Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see any reason,
except adherence to precedent, that courts should continue to allow
evidence of careful habits while barring other kinds of character
evidence. Courts should recognize careful habits testimony as
character evidence and, bar it on that basis.
The eyewitness rule and the corroboration requirement both seem to
reflect a distrust of habit evidence. The eyewitness rule arose out of a
desire to limit the use of "careful habits" evidence. It was not intended
to apply, and should not apply, to ordinary habit evidence."4 The
adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 406 would abolish the
eyewitness rule and limit it, if it survived at all, to cases where
evidence of careful habits is received.
The corroboration requirement, also abolished by Federal Rule of
Evidence 406, makes little sense because it bars routine practice
testimony in the cases where it is most needed, where there are no
eyewitnesses. A lack of corroboration does not reduce the probative
value or relevance of the evidence; it simply affects its weight. Federal
Rule of Evidence 406 insures that the evidence will be received and
given the weight it deserves.
True habit evidence is in no way inferior to other evidence, and
should be admitted on the same terms as other evidence. However,
until the Illinois Supreme Court clarifies the law, evidence of habit and
routine practice should be viewed with caution.
145. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (explaining the rationale for
admitting careful habits evidence in earlier cases as helping to prove the absence of
contributory negligence).
146. Cf. Augenstein v. Pulley, 547 N.E.2d 1345, 1350-56 (I11. App. 5th Dist.
1989) (noting that authorities conflict on the admissibility of evidence of accident
reconstruction testimony where there were eyewitnesses and holding that admissibility
of such testimony "is to be determined upon the rules announced by the supreme court for
opinion evidence").
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